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Abstract 
The public-private partnership is a popular strategy for creating global sustainable value. 
However, many public-private partnerships struggle to realize their value-added potential. Why 
do some public-private partnerships succeed while others fail, and how may those struggling 
succeed? Combining supply-chain integration and social dilemma perspectives into the 
conversation of public-private partnerships, we examine the dynamics and psychology of 
cooperation necessary for public-private partnership success. Addressing the first part of our 
research question, we recognize three social dilemmas that can manifest while managing public-
private partnership supply chains: a give-some dilemma, a take-some dilemma, and a give-or-
take-some dilemma. To address the second part of our research question, we present a taxonomy 
of strategies resolving these public-private partnership social dilemmas through the enhancement 
of trust, self-efficacy, and/or social responsibility. We discuss implications for public-private 
partnerships, supply-chain, and social dilemma literatures. 
 
Keywords: cooperation, give-some dilemma, take-some dilemma, public-private partnership, 
social dilemma, supply-chain integration   
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INTRODUCTION 
The public-private partnership (PPP) is a popular strategy for achieving collective action 
in cities, states, and nations (Skelcher, 2005). Further, PPPs are capturing interest of supply-
chain management and public-policy scholars (Fawcett, Waller, & Bowersox, 2011; Hodge & 
Greve, 2007; Yescombe, 2007). One reason for a PPP’s appeal involves enhancing social welfare 
(Linder, 1999) through “global sustainable value creation” (Mahoney, McGahan, & Pitelis, 
2009) that neither public nor private entities could achieve on their own. The second appealing 
quality is that the risks and rewards of PPPs are shared among partners (Kovács & Tatham, 
2009; Ruben, Boselie, & Lu, 2007).  
Despite their attractiveness, many PPPs struggle to create projected value (Hodge, 2004). 
Because PPPs are to enhance social welfare, their failure often brings heavy costs – not only on 
exchange partners (e.g., damaged relationship) but on third-party stakeholders (e.g., tax payers 
and community members) who rely on the PPP (Muraskin, 1998). The struggle of PPPs leads 
some to comment that PPPs “seem to have the potential to address society’s most complex 
problems [but] often appear to produce little of value” (Koschmann, Kuhn, & Pfarrer, 2012, p. 
332). We address the two-part research question “Why do some public-private partnerships 
succeed while others fail, and how may those struggling succeed?”  
The psychology and dynamics of cooperation may provide a foundation to answer our 
research question. Weihe (2010) observes that, while considerable research on PPP formation 
exists, little research addresses how cooperation is generated and sustained after PPPs are 
formed. Fawcett et al. (2011) suggest that, create value, PPPs must not only effectively integrate 
supply-chain resources to create value but cooperatively share risks and rewards.  
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We draw from two literatures to understand cooperation in PPPs: supply-chain 
integration and social dilemmas. We submit that sustaining cooperation in integrated PPP supply 
chains creates three social dilemmas: the give-some dilemma, the take-some dilemma, and the 
give-or-take-some dilemma (Dawes, 1980; McCarter, Budescu, & Scheffran, 2011). We offer a 
taxonomy of strategies for navigating these social dilemmas through enhancing trust, self-efficacy, 
and social responsibility among supply-chain partners.  
Our article makes three main contributions. First, our research answers Weihe’s (2010) 
call for examining the micro-foundations to sustained cooperation in PPPs. Second, the PPP 
context necessitates the introduction of take-some and give-or-take-some dilemmas – 
complementing well-known give-some dilemmas – into the supply-chain literature. Introducing 
these two social dilemmas opens discussion about collective-action problems that occur after 
supply-chain partners successfully pool resources. Third, our taxonomy uses governance value 
analysis (Ghosh & John, 1999) to provide specific solutions to solve social dilemmas for PPP 
supply chains.  
The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections. Section one reviews the supply-
chain integration literature germane to PPPs. Section two recognizes that integration of PPP 
supply chains is a social dilemma, and discusses three social dilemmas in PPPs. Section three 
deduces a taxonomy of solutions resolving PPP social dilemmas. Section four concludes with 
implications of our taxonomy for PPP, supply-chain integration, and social dilemma literatures.  
 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND SUPPLY CHAIN INTEGRATION 
 In our literature review we followed the steps outlined by Creswell (2008, p. 29-30). We 
identified initial keywords public-private partnership and cross-sector partnership and searched 
EBSCO and Google Scholar databases. We began with influential papers and, using a “snowball 
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technique” (Tikao, Higgins, Phillips, & Cowan, 2009), examined these key papers’ reference 
sections for additional papers germane to our research question. The snowball process continued 
until we saturated the major articles relevant to our research question. We mapped these articles 
to our research questions to determine their relevance and themes.  
In mapping the articles, two themes emerged. First, the majority of research focuses on 
the formation of PPPs – their structures and policy designs. Second, there is a dearth of research 
on sustaining cooperation after PPP formation (Weihe, 2010). Fawcett et al.’s (2011) discussion 
on PPPs suggests that the supply-chain integration and social dilemma literatures hold promise in 
understanding the dynamics of cooperation in PPPs. Based on these observations from the first 
literature search, we then conducted a second search for keywords including supply-chain 
integration (collaboration and management), governance value analysis, social dilemma, give-
some dilemma, take-some dilemma, and give-or-take-some dilemma. The remainder of this paper 
merges the supply-chain integration and social dilemma literatures to better understand PPP 
success.  
Public-Private Partnerships 
A public-private partnership (PPP) is a form of “cross-sector partnership” – a “social 
organization” composed of public and private entities attempting to create global sustainable 
value (Koschmann et al., 2012, p. 332). A PPP’s value is (in)direct and sustainable because 
stakeholders reap benefits both within and outside the partnership – and PPPs improve the living 
environment for individuals, communities, and nations (Mahoney et al., 2009).  
While there are many PPP forms, we focus on “strategic partnerships” (Skelcher, 2005), a 
PPP that seeks a collaborative advantage (Vangen & Huxham, 2003) through “permeable 
organizing practices” (Grimshaw, Vincent, & Willmott, 2002, p. 482). The sharing of risks and 
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rewards is a primary benefit and challenge for such PPPs (Heald & Georgiou, 2010; Ibrahim, 
Price, & Dainty, 2006).The next subsections use supply-chain integration and social dilemma 
literatures to understand the dynamics of sharing risks and rewards in PPPs.  
Supply-Chain Integration in the Conversation of Public-Private Partnerships 
Most PPPs are part of a supply chain or “a set of three or more entities (organizations or 
individuals) directly involved in the upstream and downstream flows of products, services, 
finances, and/or information from a source to a customer” (Mentzer et al., 2001, p. 4). Supply-
chain integration is the key to value creation (Cao & Zhang, 2011) and is “the extent to which a 
firm is strategically interconnected and aligned with its supply-chain partners” (Schoenherr & 
Swink, 2012, p. 99). The first descriptor, interconnected, refers to sharing risks and rewards 
among supply-chain members (Cooper, Lambert, & Pagh, 1997). The second descriptor, align, 
connotes that partners cooperatively share risks and rewards, sacrificing the firm’s interests in 
favor of maximizing the supply-chain’s interests (McCarter & Northcraft, 2007).  
There are at least two insights gained by applying supply-chain integration to PPP 
governance. First, as the PPP’s supply-chain integration increases, the PPP’s performance 
increases (Frohlich & Westbrook, 2001). Schoenherr and Swink’s (2012) supply-chain 
integration definition suggests that deciding to integrate processes, information, and other 
resources is only the beginning. For Schoenherr and Swink, cooperatively sharing risks and 
rewards is necessary to make supply-chain integration yield anticipated benefits. Following this 
idea our discussion assumes PPP formation occurs within a supply chain where PPP supply chain 
integration is a continuing “relationship building” process (Lambert, Emmelhainz, & Gardner, 
1999).  
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The degree of PPP supply-chain integration adapts to resource and governance 
constraints. We develop PPP supply-chain integration in using governance value analysis (Ghosh 
& John, 1999). Governance value analysis describes the extent to which partners cooperatively 
create value depends on the governance of the relationship, inimitable resources, and strategic 
position of the partners (Ghosh & John, 1999). Governance value analysis theory provides a way 
of understanding why PPPs tackling the same social problem may do so by integrating their 
resources differently (Nickerson, Hamilton, & Wada, 2001). To illustrate, Kovács and colleagues 
(2012) find that job advertisements for humanitarian logisticians vary for similar disasters based 
on the complexity of coordination responses. In Haiti, job advertisements were short and 
specific, focusing on functional logistics. In other disaster responses (e.g., Sudan and Congo), 
job advertisements were lengthy with a broad swath of skills. In Haiti, coordination was well-
specified with each transaction managed at arm’s length. In the Congo, transactions required 
additional cooperation between supply chain representatives. The PPPs varying approaches to 
integration expose them to unique solutions that induce the social dilemma: attempting mutual 
cooperation when sharing risks and rewards (Fawcett, Allred, Magnan, & Ogden, 2009). 
 
RECOGNIZING PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP SOCIAL DILEMMAS 
Garrett Hardin’s (1974, p. 562) discussion about human cooperation suggests that the 
first step toward achieving collective action is to “create … awareness” of the social dilemmas so 
“that people will be able to recognize [a social dilemma’s] many varieties, however, disguised.” 
Following Hardin’s recommendation, we recognize that integration of a PPP’s supply chain is a 
social dilemma (McCarter & Northcraft, 2007). A social dilemma is “a situation in which there is 
a strategy that provides an [individual] with the best payoff in at least one configuration of 
strategy choices and that strategy has a negative impact on the interests of the other [individuals] 
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involved, and the choice of that particular strategy by all [or enough individuals] results in a 
deficient outcome” (Liebrand, 1983, p. 124). Applying the social dilemma paradigm to PPPs, we 
maintain that anytime a PPP integrates its supply chain, the sharing of risks and rewards creates a 
temptation to enjoy the rewards while avoiding the risks (Zeng & Chen, 2003). The tension of 
cooperatively sharing risks and rewards involves the allocation and distribution of shared 
resources (Fawcett, Magnan, & McCarter, 2008a). In social dilemmas, effective allocation and 
distribution of shared resources enhances social welfare, while opportunistic behavior damages 
social welfare (Komorita & Parks, 1994). The resources allocated and distributed can be tangible 
(e.g., money, inventory, or water) or intangible; e.g., effort, affirmation, ideas, or acceptance.  
A classic social dilemma is the “Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin, 1968). Hardin 
(1968) imagines a group of herdsmen sharing a pasture (the commons). As is typical of 
constrained resources, the commons pasture has a carrying capacity that, once surpassed, 
cripples the resource permanently. Each herder wants to maximize profits by increasing the size 
of his herd, and the profits are private to the herdsman. However, the cost of each additional 
animal to the commons is born by all the herdsmen. The rational behavior for each herdsman is 
thus to increase the size of their herd without restraint. However, if all herdsmen increase their 
herd size and subsequently overgraze the commons then all the herds starve. Individual 
rationality in the short run leads to collective ruin in the long run – thus the social dilemma.  
The social dilemma research domain comports well with the PPP literature in several 
ways. Both literatures identify metaphor to explain the challenges inherent to collective action 
(Ghere, 2001; Hardin, 1974). And, each literature stream pushes for ways of navigating 
collective action (Jamali, 2004; Van Lange, Joireman, Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013).  
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Dawes (1980), and more recently McCarter, Budescu, and Scheffran (2011), maintain 
that social dilemmas can be viewed in three metaphors. The first is a give-some dilemma, the 
second a take-some dilemma, and the third a give-or-take-some dilemma. The adjectives 
preceding each dilemma describes the focal choices individuals face to further self- or collective 
interests.  
Our use of social dilemmas and their resolution comport with the position that micro-
based theories enlighten us about macro-organizational phenomena such as PPP success or 
failure. As observed by Staw (1991, p. 807), many “organizational actions are actually [rooted 
in] individual behavior[s].” When scholars say that “a major player in the supply chain decides to 
upgrade to a new technology” (Duclos, Vokurka, & Lummus, 2003, p. 453), these scholars 
suggest that the player is acting on behalf of the firm in their role as technology adopters (e.g. 
Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). Congruent with Staw’s (1991) theorizing, we use social 
dilemma theory to explain why individuals cooperate or defect in PPPs.  
Drawing from journalistic accounts and anecdotal evidence, the remainder of this section 
expounds on these three social dilemmas facing real-world PPPs managing supply chain 
integration. Our examples illustrate the use of these three metaphors in a PPP social dilemma 
context. Our use of journalistic accounts and anecdotal evidence follows Ordóñez and 
colleagues’ (2009, p. 82) position that journalistic accounts and anecdotal evidence “raise 
questions, focus attention and develop ideas that should be subjected to rigorous, causal 
analyses.”  
Give-Some Dilemma 
In the give-some dilemma the stakeholder can either give resources to further the 
collective’s interest or withhold resources to further their own interests while hoping to enjoy the 
benefits of collective action. The giving of resources is risky to the individual but provides 
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shared rewards to others (Messick & Brewer, 1983). A typical supply-chain example of a give-
some dilemma is a shared, discretionary database that provides partners with current customer 
trends, state policies, and other valuable pieces of information (Connolly & Thorn, 1990). Each 
supply-chain partner has incentive to withhold information while hoping the other partners give 
information to support the database. Yet, if all partners (or enough) withhold information then 
they reap no benefit (Cabrera & Cabrera, 2002).  
A give-some dilemma involving iodized salt distribution PPP. Essential natural resource 
distribution (e.g., water, air, and salt) often require cooperation through PPPs. The maintenance 
of natural resources rewards stakeholders with a long-term sustainable supply as well as positive 
externalities (e.g., health and well-being). At the same time, each stakeholder risks having 
another stakeholder exploit the resource by free-riding. The fear of others free ridding results in 
partners’ temptation to withhold their contribution of resources. Each stakeholder must give to 
the partnership to enjoy joint benefit.  
 An example of the give-some dilemma can be found in the iodized salt delivery process 
in India. This 1950s PPP involves the United Nations International Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 
the Indian government, and small-medium sized businesses in each of India’s 28 states and seven 
territories (Salon, 2001). While iodized salt is critical to human development, estimates suggest 
that nearly half of Indians suffer from iodine deficiency (UNICEF, 2010). Thus eradicating 
iodine deficiency would improve India’s labor productivity. The Indian government established 
the National Iodine Deficiency Disorders Control Program to discourage consumption of non-
iodized salt and to encourage railway cooperation in iodized salt distribution. UNICEF 
contributed to the PPP by building salt treatment facilities throughout India. Local businesses 
contributed to the PPP by reducing the production of non-iodized salt. 
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Despite the PPP’s efforts to eradicate consumption of non-iodized salt, the problem 
persists. The parties have failed to give sufficient resources to support the PPP. Small and 
medium sized firms resisted giving up their non-iodized salt production. The national and 
regional governments failed to provide regulatory enforcement and oversight by not completing 
a ban on non-iodized salt (Indo Asian News Service, 2011). The end result was that the salt 
iodization facilities fell into disrepair due to half-hearted contributions by firms and the 
government (Chen & Bachrach, 2003). Currently, UNICEF’s efforts include using local 
agricultural distributors to offset marketing, distribution, and production costs of small and 
medium iodized salt businesses (Gulati, 2009).  
Take-Some Dilemma 
Take-some dilemmas occur when a stakeholder chooses to take a portion of shared 
resources to further their self-interests instead of leaving those resources to benefit the collective 
(Messick & Brewer, 1983). This dilemma manifests itself in two forms. First, the stakeholder can 
access and overuse the shared resource (Ostrom, 1990). The second occurs when a stakeholder 
restricts access to the shared resource, making it underused (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998). An 
example of the overuse in the take-some dilemma is in green supply-chain initiatives such as 
water management (Zhu & Sarkis, 2004). Farmers sharing a watershed with businesses and 
consumers face a choice between taking as much fresh water as possible or adopting a the 
practice of reduced water consumption which benefits the collective (Lubell, 2004). The 
excessive water consumption provides the farmer with benefits such as higher crop yields while 
spreading the costs of reduced water supply across the other farmers, businesses, and consumers. 
However, if enough engage in excess consumption of water then a water shortage occurs leaving 
the farmers, businesses, and consumers worse off (Bronson, 2004).  
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A take-some dilemma involving credit in a geo-engineering PPP. The Stratospheric 
Particle Injection for Climate Engineering (SPICE) Project provides an illustration of the second 
take-some dilemma form. This UK PPP is composed of government, universities, and Marshall 
Aerospace, and investigates ways of reducing global warming effects through geo-engineering 
(Daily Mail, 2011). The PPP created a large balloon that sprays particles into the atmosphere 
with the hope of cooling down a geographic region. The success of the PPP is made possible by 
collaborative innovations from public and private institutions. While collaboration was initially 
successful, the project was indefinitely suspended in May 2012 (Cressey, 2012).  
The project disruption was because individual stakeholders took inappropriate amounts of 
credit (Graham & Cooper, in press). Several of the teams tried to patent processes and 
technologies that were arguably the result of the collaboration and not the individual team. The 
take-some dilemma here is in the form of exercising intellectual property rights and economic 
rents at the cost of the overall project (Marshall, 2012). More specifically, the more credit one 
team took the less credit there was for others. Further the use of regulation through patents 
increased the transaction costs by forcing teams to get permission to use and distribute any future 
profits earned from the project’s innovations. The inability to determine fair governance, in this 
case whether it is fair to patent portions of the collaborative work, resulted in PPP “gridlock” 
(Heller, 2008).  
Give-or-Take-Some Dilemma 
The third, and least studied, social dilemma is the give-or-take-some dilemma – a 
combination of the give-some and take-some dilemmas (Van Lange et al., 2013). A give-or-take-
some dilemma is when some individuals give while others take from a shared resource. In this 
dilemma social welfare suffers when too little is given, or too much taken, from shared resources 
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(McCarter, Budescu, & Scheffran, 2011). The give-or-take-some dilemma highlights social 
problems that are composed of several, interlinked social dilemmas, where the dilemma can 
happen on the giving side, the taking side, or both.  
Supply-chain examples of the give-or-take-some dilemmas are humanitarian supply 
chains engaged in providing world food “banks” (Hardin, 1974, 1985). Hardin (1974) describes 
this dilemma using a humanitarian supply chain where a fortunate nation’s farmers and citizens 
sell or give food and other provisions to local non-government organizations. These non-
government organizations then transport these supplies to less-fortunate nations. The dilemma 
arises because the food given to the less-fortunate nation takes away from the fortunate nation’s 
reserves for national emergencies. As maintained by Hardin (1974), self-interests can lead to 
collective ruin when we an emergency strikes any stakeholder (both the fortunate and the 
unfortunate) and there is increasing resource needs in the unfortunate nation over time. For 
instance, the fortunate nation’s farmers have incentive to sell to their nation’s government as 
much food as possible for shipping across borders. At the same time the unfortunate nation’s 
leaders have an incentive to take as much food as possible at a discounted cost without becoming 
self-reliant. However, persisting in this strategy may bring harm to both groups of stakeholders 
(Hardin, 1985). Hardin (1974) observes that the unfortunate nations’ population could continue 
growing without improving their food production which results in more internal demand and less 
internal supply. The fortunate nations supply an ever increasing amount of food by the 
humanitarian supply chain thus increasing the probability that the fortunate nation will face a 
shortage during an emergency. The cycle continues until the fortunate nations cannot meet their 
own needs when an emergency strikes (e.g., crop failure), let alone supply enough resources for 
the growing unfortunate nation’s needs (Hardin, 1974).  
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An example of a give-or-take-some dilemma in US horse rescue PPPs. The US horse 
racing industry is an example of a give-or-take-some social dilemma. Like the European PPP 
that runs the End of Life Vehicles Directive to deal with millions of tons of auto waste each year 
(European Commission, 2012), the US horseracing industry has several PPPs that specialize in 
“disposing” of horses at the end of their useable life. In this industry, breeders supply 
Thoroughbred horses (alternatively known as “bloodstock”) used by horse trainers and owners. 
A typical horse has useable product life of five to 10 years. The horse may live for an additional 
10 to 20 years with diminished marginal utility. Breeders and owners face large operating 
expenses maintaining horses during the later years. The upstream breeders and downstream 
market owners face increasing expenses maintaining these horses. In recent years PPPs have 
formed between the government, and industry to operate non-profit horse rescues.  
The PPPs face a give-or-take-some dilemma. The “giving” portion of the dilemma is due 
to the fact that the breeders should give their resources (e.g. excess pasture-land) to carry the 
costs of their unwanted horses. Likewise, horse rescues must give their resources to evaluate and 
re-habilitate abandoned horses. The PPP is at risk of free-riding when breeders continue breeding 
their horses without giving their pasture-land which results in horse rescues carrying the cost of 
unwanted horses. Overwhelmed, the horse rescue facilities limit capacity, unable to take on any 
additional unwanted horses because of free-riding by breeders.  
The “taking” portion of the dilemma is due to the fact that owners capture value by 
selling horses to owners competing in equestrian competition. The value of an individual horse is 
largely determined by proven bloodlines from equestrian competition. The breeders are less 
likely to identify successful bloodlines when fewer owners participate in horse sports. Without 
owner investment, breeders keep breeding increasingly inferior horses which require more 
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resource consumption for lower value products. Like the horse breeders, horse rescues capture 
value by adopting unwanted horses. Owners may also place a burden on the horse rescues by 
returning the adopted horses as they become exhausted by sharing their resources between the 
rescues and their sport. Rather than cooperating to create new market segments, breeders and 
rescues are tempted to compete for the remaining owners while neglecting opportunities for 
increasingly needy horses. The take-some dilemma occurs when breeders or the horse-rescues 
cannot extract value from the PPP by either selling horses or adopting horses.  
Left unchecked this supply chain collapses from a give-or-take-some dilemma. The 
pernicious cycle between breeders, owners and rescues ratchets up. Breeding firms and horse 
rescues declared bankruptcy due to the absence of owners investing in horses. With no remaining 
capacity to take on the horses, many domesticated horses were set free, illegally, on other’s 
private property and public land (Sun Times, 2012). 
 
RESOLVING PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP SOCIAL DILEMMAS 
Once we are able to recognize the three social dilemmas facing PPPs, we may turn to 
discussing how supply-chain integration and social dilemma literatures can help us navigate 
these dilemmas. Answering the call for theoretical elaboration on the mechanisms and 
antecedents to cooperation in PPPs (Kivleniece & Quelin, 2012), this section presents the 
mechanisms for cooperation and a taxonomy of modes for encouraging cooperation in PPP 
social dilemmas.  
Psychological Mechanisms to Cooperation 
Social dilemma theory identifies three cooperation mechanisms: trust (Rockmann & 
Northcraft, 2008), efficacy (Kerr, 1996), and social responsibility (De Cremer & Van Lange, 
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2001). Trust is “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon 
positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & 
Camerer, 1998, p. 395). For cooperation to occur in social dilemmas, partners must not only 
want to cooperate but also expect that the other partners will cooperate (McCarter, Mahoney, & 
Northcraft, 2011; Morgan & Hunt, 1994).  
Efficacy is a “conviction that one can successfully execute the behavior required to 
produce the outcomes” (Bandura, 1977, p. 193). Comparing trust to efficacy, trust then is a 
motivator about intentions to cooperate. Efficacy as a motivator is about the means to cooperate 
(Kerr, 1992).  
Lastly, social responsibility is “the moral obligation to further the collective’s interest” 
(van Dijk & Wilke, 1997, p. 197). When it is clear that one’s actions can impact another’s 
wellbeing, a moral norm is activated – a perception of how one should act, and failure to follow 
this norm diminishes self-worth (Schwartz, 1970). The idea of norms, similar to social dilemma, 
suggests that as individuals focus more on how their behavior affects others, they will perceive 
cooperation as the right course of action (Schwartz-Shea & Simmons, 1995).  
A Taxonomy of Modes to Cooperation in Public-private Partnership Social Dilemmas 
Our taxonomy combines social psychology and management approaches to navigating 
social dilemmas. Social psychology reviews of social dilemma solutions focuses on how the 
solution is executed. Management research focuses on what the solution does to increase 
cooperation.  
The first dimension of our current taxonomy comes from social psychologists Messick 
and Brewer (1983) who separate social dilemma solutions by whether they are unilaterally or 
jointly implemented. Relating this idea to PPP social dilemmas, governance value analysis 
suggests that PPPs may be governed autonomously or integrative (Kivleniece & Quelin, 2012). 
17 
Autonomous PPPs require cooperation but feature intense private firm authority. Integrated PPPs 
exhibit joint authority and rights between the public and private partner. The joint-unilateral 
dimension describes whether the intervention is imposed unilaterally (e.g., one partner behaving 
autonomously) or through integration which coordinated efforts by all partners in the social 
dilemma.  
Our second taxonomic dimension is taken from management scholars Zeng and Chen 
(2003), who separate social dilemma solutions into whether the intervention affects the partners’ 
perception of the social dilemma’s structure, called structural solutions, or of perceptions of each 
partner, called motivational solutions. Delineating between structural and motivation solutions 
enhances understanding of how PPPs can navigate social dilemmas because PPP supply chains 
may need to select either proactive or reactive solutions (Martens, Crum, & Poist, 2011). A 
reactive structural solution may be socially costly while a proactive motivational solution may 
prove impractical due to time constraints. For example, a PPP may not excuse a member as a 
structural solution to scale problems because of public opinion. Likewise, a motivational 
response may not induce cooperation quickly enough in a humanitarian emergency. 
Table 1 summarizes our taxonomy with the joint-unilateral (or the means) dimension on 
the Y-axis and the structural-motivational (or the ends) dimension on the X-axis. In addition to 
bridging management (Zeng & Chen, 2003) and social psychology (Messick & Brewer, 1983) 
approaches to studying social dilemmas, our taxonomy allows managers to know what strategies 
are at their disposal as a function of the PPP’s structure and manager autonomy. For instance, 
Quadrant IV would stem from circumstances where PPPs have difficulty manipulating payoffs 
and the manager enhancing the relationship among partners lacks sufficient buy-in. The 
taxonomy provides the manager a vehicle to consider strategies from different quadrants and 
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predict whether these other strategies would be feasible in garnering collective action. The 
usefulness of the taxonomy requires managers to select the appropriate quadrant for their PPP.  
In the remaining portion of section three, we review each quadrant in Table 1, provide 
two modes of enhancing cooperation, discuss the psychological mechanisms affected by the 
modes, and provide examples of PPPs using these modes. The two modes in each quadrant of the 
taxonomy are merely samples. In the current taxonomy the mechanisms – trust, efficacy, and 
social responsibility – are not bound to a particular quadrant or mode. In some instances, a 
mode’s effect on cooperation may hinge on several mechanisms.  
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
 
Quadrant I: Joint-Structural Solutions 
Quadrant I contains joint-structural solutions coordinated and implemented by the 
partners to alter how the social dilemma is perceived by those involved. Two modes of joint-
structural solutions are criticality and the number of partners in the PPP.  
Criticality. One reason for self-interest in PPP social dilemmas is that a partner has 
incentive to free-ride on the cooperative behavior of others (Smith, Woodward, Acharya, 
Beaglehole, & Drager, 2004). A reason for partners’ free riding is that they are substitutable 
(McCarter & Northcraft, 2007), that is their input is perceived as replaceable by others, because 
of this a partner may opt to free ride relying on others to “pick up the slack” (McCorkle et al., 
1999).  
One way of discouraging free-riding is to have unique critical partner contributions 
(Chen, Au, & Komorita, 1996). When each partner is critical for attaining collective action, free-
riding becomes impossible (Kollock, 1998). In supply chains, criticality occurs structurally or 
psychologically. For instance, supply-base reduction minimization the actual number of partners 
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in the supply chain which reduces coordination and monitoring costs (Sarkar & Mohapatra, 
2006; Ogden & McCarter, 2004). Creating criticality in PPPs enhances cooperation in two ways. 
First, individuals experience enhanced self-efficacy because they perceive themselves as having 
a greater impact of achieving collective action (Chen et al., 1996). Second, individuals’ trust in 
the partnership increases because a structure with high criticality removes the incentive to free-
ride (McCarter & Northcraft, 2007).  
An example of this is the Tripartite First Nations Health Plan composed of the First 
Nations Health Council, British Columbia Ministry of Healthy Living, and Canadian Public 
Affairs. Tripartite First Nations Health Plan’s goal is to improve the health of children and 
families of aboriginal descent in Canada. To encourage cooperation, the partners of this PPP 
stress that each other’s contribution is essential and has structured the PPP such that each partner 
holds a resource that cannot be substituted by another partner (First Nations Health Council, 
2009). 
Number of partners. Another reason for self-interest in social dilemmas is that partners 
become overwhelmed by the complexity of achieving collective action (Weick, 1984). A 
common source of complexity is the number of partners attempting collective action (Franzen, 
1994). PPP scholarship recognizes the potential tradeoff of partnership size. While more partners 
can equate to more resources, more partners can also equate to cooperation problems (Hartwich 
et al., 2007).  
There are several reasons why decreasing the number of partners enhances cooperation. 
Individuals that are part of groups small in size see themselves as more efficacious in achieving 
collective action (Kerr, 1989). Further, trust in each other’s intentions to cooperate has more of 
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an impact on small groups (Sato, 1988). Hartwich and colleagues (2007) submit that controlling 
the number of partners is essential for PPP success for “confidence building” among partners.  
Reducing the number of PPP partners, within reason, leads to lower transaction costs and 
higher cooperation (Olson, 1965). For example, PPPs in Kenyan vegetable supply chains faced 
high transaction costs because partnerships were as large as 350 partners (Narrod et al., 2009). 
Narrod and colleagues (2009) observed that decreasing the PPP partnership base tenfold reduced 
transaction costs and encourages cooperation.  
Quadrant II: Joint-Motivational Solutions 
Quadrant II holds the joint-motivational solutions that partners coordinate and implement 
to alter how they perceive one another. Two modes of encouraging cooperation through joint-
motivation are perceived interdependence and beneficiary contact.  
Perceived interdependence. Self-interest abounds when partners perceive their actions as 
completely independent. Interdependence can be established by shaping the individuals’ 
perception of the problem (Schwartz-Shea & Simmons, 1995). Depending on how partners frame 
the problem, they may place different weights on self- and collective interests (Tenbrunsel & 
Northcraft, 2010). When partners view the problem differently, one partner may perceive their 
behavior as interdependent while others view their behavior as independent. In a study of hotel 
towel reuse, Goldstein et al. (2008) found that invoking a frame closer to an individual’s 
immediate situation is more effective than general environmental appeals. Individuals are more 
likely to view their choices as interdependent when others perceive themselves more similar to 
each other. 
Trust is increased when individuals view the frame as interdependent. Trust stems from 
individuals ability to identify with each other. For example, Goldstein et al.’s (2008) hotel towel 
reuse study harkens to the Christian adage “love thy neighbor as thyself”. When we identify the 
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others who had previously stayed in the same hotel room with ourselves we are more likely to 
cooperate and reuse the towels. Individuals trust through a leap of faith that the others at the 
hotel are indeed similar (Van de Ven & Ring, 2006).  
Such perceived interdependence could resolve the dilemma faced by horse rescues PPPs. 
Horse breeders may be less likely to breed beyond demand and attend to end-of-useable life care 
of horses if they view their breeding decisions as interdependent with horse rescues and owners. 
Breeding farms tend to be short-sighted during hot markets and breed several offspring despite 
the risk that the offspring may come of age during a cold market (Whiteley, 2010). These firms’ 
independent decisions lead to overcapacity driving down prices. The breeding farms are worse 
off and must increasingly rely on the horse rescues to pick up the excess capacity of horses. 
Thus, the breeders need to trust each other that one breeder is not going to take advantage of 
others’ capacity by over-breeding. By framing the problem as one of joint interdependence, the 
breeders are more likely to commit to managing end-of-useable life in their present breeding 
decisions. 
Beneficiary contact. PPPs form to affect individuals, families, and communities in 
positive ways (Reich, 2000). In relationships, social-dilemma solutions change human behavior 
such that individuals, families, and communities incur social benefits rather than social burdens. 
Kollock (1998) suggests that individuals are not myopic in terms of self-interest, and self-interest 
exacerbates social dilemmas.  
Social dilemmas may reach resolution by enhancing partners perceived impact on 
beneficiaries. A beneficiary is broadly defined as “the people and groups of people who believe 
their actions … have the potential to positively affect” (Grant, 2007, p. 395). This perceived 
impact can be achieved by contact between the partners and beneficiary in the social dilemma. 
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The PPP may be structured “to provide opportunities for [partners] to interact and communicate 
with the people affected by their work” (Grant, 2007, p. 398). This may be why PPPs attempting 
to navigate give-some dilemmas invite donors to tour program offices and meet people who 
receive assistance (California Polytechnic State University, 2012). Similarly, leaders in PPPs 
may accomplish the same thing by establishing contact between PPP partners and individual, 
family, and community members that affected by successful collective action (Grant, 2012). The 
International Organization for Migration uses such a strategy. This organization arranges for case 
workers to meet with individuals saved from human trafficking by the efforts of these case 
workers (Berman, Asheer, Miller, & Halvorsen, 2010).  
Beneficiary contact encourages cooperation by increasing efficacy, what Grant (2007) 
terms perceived beneficiary impact. Individuals see the impact they have on another and this 
feedback resolves the uncertainty about the contribution their cooperation makes (Kerr, 1992). 
Grant et al. (2007) found that fundraising workers’ contact with beneficiaries, such as receiving 
appreciation letters, increased the amount of donations these workers subsequently raised, and 
this effect was mediated by perceived impact.  
Quadrant III: Unilateral-Structural Solutions 
The solutions in Quadrant III are unilateral-structural solutions implemented by 
individual partners to alter how the other partners perceive the social dilemma’s structure. The 
two modes consistent with Table 1 are informal sanctions and the framing ownership.  
Informal sanctions. Informal sanctions are unilateral structural mechanisms which 
induce cooperation in social dilemmas (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). Individuals relying on 
informal sanctions invoke trust. Parties cooperate due to the perceived benefit that they will gain 
from the interaction but are wary that in a high trust/high distrust conditions an individual may 
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retaliate (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998). Thus, “opportunities are pursued, but the risks are 
regularly monitored” (Rousseau et al., 1998, p. 399).  
Heightened monitoring occurs when individuals use informal sanctions, such as in 
doctoral advisor-student relationships. For instance, doctoral students may fear that their advisors 
will not give them as much time and feedback, in favor of other colleagues and students, thereby 
omitting valuable information. In reality, the advisor may simply be managing the plethora of 
tasks and responsibilities at hand (Kramer, 1994). Such a heightened sensitivity causes 
individuals to misinterpret information related to the antecedents of trust (Kramer, 1996). Indeed, 
Kramer’s (1994) study of student-advisor relationships found that advisors were more likely to 
attend to task-performance based aspects of trust, while students spent three-times more of their 
attention on relationship based aspects of trust. The student merely perceives a potential risk to 
future benefits, opts to cooperate, and continuously obsesses over such risks. Thus, informal 
sanctions may prime individuals to cooperate by cultivating trust and keeping the partners wary 
of potential retaliation even if such retaliation is indirect.  
PPPs related to R&D initiatives may experience an informal sanction when key scientific 
information is withheld from a scientist who fails to cooperate with their scientific community. 
In an R&D alliance, a scientist who changed allegiances between the firms was outcast (de 
Rond, 2003). In stable communities like scientific research fields an informal sanction is 
effective. This is because a scientist’s early research discoveries and future promotions depend 
on a community of scholars to promote the scientist’s research stream. Thus, a PPP requiring the 
full cooperation of researchers face an informal sanction of lossed access to vital information and 
support for their research stream.  
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Framing ownership. Partners involved in a social dilemma do not necessarily see the 
situation similarly (Tenbrunsel & Northcraft, 2010). There is often uncertainty in situations about 
what rules and behaviors are appropriate (March, 1994). Because of this uncertainty, individuals 
perceive situations differently due to various contextual cues and different norms (Messick, 
1999). Drawing from appropriateness logic, Weber et al. (2004, p. 283) submits that individuals 
do not only calculate the costs and benefits of cooperation in social dilemmas, but also 
subconsciously ask themselves “What is the normative context of this situation, and what would 
others expect me to do in a situation like this one?” Thus an individual’s perception of socially 
responsibility alters by mere changes in social context, rather than the payoff structure (van Dijk 
& Wilke, 1997). 
Mismatched logics of appropriateness are a barrier to new geo-engineered technology 
that is created through the SPICE partnership (Cressey, 2012). In this PPP, partners cannot agree 
on who owns certain technologies. Some partners perceive the project as “theirs” and 
consequently perceive that they are entitled to additional rents and rights. In contrast, others 
perceive the project as open source and that everyone is entitled to the benefits from SPICE 
initiatives.  
Quadrant IV: Unilateral-Motivational Solutions 
Quadrant IV contains the unilateral-motivational solutions that an individual partner may 
use to impact how the partners view each other. The modes illustrated in this section are 
communication and group identity.  
Communication. Communication, particularly fact to face communication, induces 
cooperation in social dilemmas (Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977). Partners gain additional 
information about each another and the details of the social dilemma (Kollock, 1998).  
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Communication develops trust which leads to cooperation (Ostrom, 1998). Trust is 
created by reliable and dependable ongoing interactions (Rousseau et al., 1998). When 
individuals can predict the reliability of the other’s actions they have a higher likelihood of 
cooperating with each other (Axelrod, 1984). Communication allows individuals to agree about 
their level of commitment to the collective and thus builds trust.  
In PPPs, communicating may yield higher levels of cooperation. For instance, greater 
communication about the end-of-useable life problems between breeders, owners and rescues 
may increase their sense of commitment to managing herd levels. Breeders may plan for end-of-
useable life care, even if the long-term effects of their breeding are delayed by thirty-years. 
Moreover, breeders that regularly commit to conversations about population level management 
and end-of-useable life issues could trust each other to cooperate and manage herd levels. Indeed 
growing levels of industry lobbying brought the parties together who would ordinarily not meet 
face-to-face. Such meetings proved invaluable for additional insights into the over-population 
problem and subsequently increasing support. PPPs that communicate, and in particular 
communicate face-to-face, may have lower coordination problems (New York Thoroughbred 
Horseman’s Association Newsletter, 2012).  
Group identity. Group identity is an invaluable way of encouraging cooperation. Identity 
is the way that we display intentions and establish norms and build our PPP reputation (Ostrom, 
1998). Norms shape the internal valuation an individual places in their actions (Ostrom, 1998). A 
group member might gain a positive valuation such as the “warm glow” (Andreoni, 1995) by 
helping another more than themselves. Alternatively, group members might incur a negative 
valuation by performing an act out of “duty” (Knack, 1992). Such norms foster a community 
which seeks to maintain and enforce a group’s identity (Coleman, 1987).  
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Trust, particularly of a relational form, may elicit more of an emotional response from 
identification with others (Coleman, 1990). Deeply-held partner norms may be at risk of 
violation when actors face a social dilemma. Our reputation, built upon group identity, sets the 
stage for whether others can expect us act in a cooperative manner. Thus, a group’s identity and 
coinciding norms affect their ability to perceive each other as trustworthy and whether the group 
members will reciprocate (Ostrom, 1998).  
A partner that encourages group identity fosters a greater sense of cooperation. This is 
particularly true in instances where stakeholders may have competing or conflicting beliefs 
regarding the group norms (Zaheer & Fudge Kamal, 2011). UNICEF unilaterally created a 
shared identity with the local communities and businesses to provide iodized salt (Gulati, 2009). 
The local communities needed education on the health benefits of the iodized salt over naturally 
available salt. Efforts in aligning the project with local norms through imagery and local festivals 
proved invaluable. UNICEF also gained the cooperation of local companies through food 
cooperatives to distribute the iodized salt. The PPP for iodized salt in India claims its greatest 
successes due to public mobilization from a shared identity and norms of responsibility 
protecting the salt. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The current theorizing responds to the seeming absence of social dilemma research (e.g. 
Defee, Williams, Randall, & Thomas, 2010) in the supply chain literature. Viewing the 
governance of PPP supply chains as a social dilemma makes several contributions to PPP 
research. First, the social dilemma framework, coupled with our taxonomy, provides a 
psychological foundation of understanding and improving cooperation in PPPs. Weihe’s (2010) 
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work on PPPs, essentially asks the question “once a PPP is formed through integration how is 
cooperation sustained and hindered?” Answering this question reveals a paradox of PPPs. PPPs 
form to address large-scale social dilemmas facing communities and nations (Kivleniece & 
Quelin, 2012), and yet once PPPs form, a PPP’s success is a social dilemma in and of itself. 
Partners are torn between cooperating and competing with each other to achieve goals that 
benefit themselves as well as social welfare (Das & Teng, 2000). Our taxonomy helps navigate 
the cooperation-competition paradox. 
Second, the majority of social dilemma research in operations management and 
management science focuses on give-some dilemmas (Agarwal, Croson, & Mahoney, 2010; 
Celly, Spekman, & Kamauff, 1999; Fawcett, Magnan, & McCarter, 2008b; Gulati, Khanna, & 
Nohria, 1994; Kivleniece & Quelin, 2012; McCarter & Northcraft, 2007; Zeng & Chen, 2003). 
The emphasis on give-some dilemmas is most likely because this research focus on resource 
pooling as a means to create value. By introducing take-some and give-or-take-some dilemmas, 
we consider what comes after resource pooling. In doing so we seek to ask and answer the 
Hardin (1976, p. 122) question “and then what?” Hardin (1976, p. 124) observed that, when 
addressing social problems, “you can never do just one thing.” The sustainable PPPs may 
become a resource that partners may desire to control. The SPICE project illustrates this 
dilemma. The PPP successfully pooled resources and navigated the give-some dilemma to create 
a new technology aimed at alleviating global warming. However, this process created a take-
some dilemma. Various partners sought to take more credit and control than was perceived fair. 
This resulted value for no one. The resources ended up simply sitting in a warehouse. Thus, for 
PPPs to succeed, we submit that supply-chain integration is only the beginning of a successful 
cooperative PPP governance process.  
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Third, our taxonomy extends the supply-chain concept of governance value analysis. 
Governance value analysis focuses on how alliance structures, such as those found in PPPs, form 
as a function of the interplay amongst partners’ resources. Combining this literature with the 
social dilemma paradigm, we are able posit which PPP governance strategies – unilateral or joint 
– will be used as a function of autonomous or integrated strategic partnership. This insight holds 
key implications for managers seeking to govern integrated PPP supply chains by providing a 
starting point for what types of solutions support the partnership function of the PPP.  
We use the PPP context to push our thinking about social dilemmas. Past social dilemma 
research makes the assumption that giving more or taking less is pro-social behavior (Dawes, 
1980; Van Lange et al., 2013). However, the complexity of PPPs suggests that partners can 
perceive they are cooperating in a welfare-enhancing system while in actuality their 
“cooperative” behavior only makes social welfare worse (Hardin, 1974). While recent social 
dilemma scholarship observes that non-cooperative behavior can be unintentional (Tenbrunsel & 
Northcraft, 2010), we extend this idea by submitting that intended cooperative behavior can 
actually harm the collective’s welfare.  
We introduce the idea of a social dilemma view to PPPs. In doing so, we provide several 
directions for PPPs specifically and supply chain research generally. One area for further 
research involves supply-chain arcs of integration (e.g. Frohlich and Westbrook, 2001). For 
instance, skewed arcs either upstream or downstream may be blocked from full integration. The 
supply chain remains skewed in its integration to compensate for a social dilemma faced at the 
other end of the supply chain. By considering the resources and positions of the supply-chain 
partners full integration, that is the outward facing arcs, may be achieved using our taxonomy.  
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Another extension considers the interplay of the social dilemmas throughout a supply 
chain. Davis and Cobb (2010) claim that overly concentrated economic activity is linked to 
social inequality. Similarly, Ruester and Neumann (2009) find that transaction costs can spill 
over from one-transaction to the next moving upstream in a supply chain. PPPs may form as a 
reaction to burgeoning coordination problems due to an unresolved and pernicious social 
dilemma. However, the PPP integration may reflect multiple social dilemmas both upstream and 
downstream. Overly large public-private partnerships may be responding to various social 
dilemmas building throughout the supply chain. PPPs may fail to achieve desired performance 
benefits because the partners neglected the interplay between social dilemmas at multiple 
transactions.  
We drew from social dilemma and supply chain management literatures to describe one 
reason for the success and failure of PPPs. While PPPs create value, their integration can 
constitute three social dilemmas. These dilemmas stem from the giving of resources, the taking 
of resources, or a hybrid of the two. This means that supply chain partners must maintain 
cooperation to enhance PPP performance. By describing this process we have established a 
foundation that future researchers can use to begin to address calls to understand the psychology 
of cooperation at the core of successful public-private partnerships. 
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Table 1. An integrative taxonomy of solutions to public-private partnership social dilemmas 
  What does the solution affect?  
 
  
Structure 
(Perceptions of payoffs)  
Motivations 
(Perceptions of partners)  
How is the solution  
implemented?  
 
Jointly  
(Integrated) 
I 
• Criticality 
• Number of partners 
II 
• Perceived interdependence 
• Beneficiary contact 
Unilaterally 
(Autonomous)  
III 
• Informal sanctions 
• Framing ownership 
IV 
• Communication 
• Group identity 
 
 
 
 
 
